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THE ROLE OF THE ARTICLE I 
"TRIAL JUDGE" 
EDWARD F. LUSSIER· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It makes little sense to debate the worth of any role without 
defining its purpose and past performance. Also, it should be recog­
nized at the outset that the field of administrative law has grown, as 
have other fields oflaw, in direct proportion to the growth of govern­
ment and the need to provide fair alternatives to ever growing court 
dockets. No such alternatives have realistically presented themselves 
without simultaneous recognition that disputes which cannot be set­
tled by agreement require a resolution process which is both per­
ceived as fair and is productive of a record which will permit the 
most effective and least burdensome court review. Since most claims 
where the federal government is a party provide for court review I 
and because many, if not most, involve complex factual issues, and 
none involve juries, the role of the individual decider of fact be­
comes significant. All the more so because the individual judge who 
presides is given latitude in important matters such as discovery and 
admissibility of evidence and in the conduct of the evidentiary hear­
ing2 which directly affects the record upon which the decision will 
ultimately be based. No trial lawyer would regard these powers 
lightly in consideration of the fact that later court review will be 
based on that record. It is therefore of great interest to the practicing 
• Administrative Law Judge, Department of Health &: Human Services; fonner 
Judicial Officer for United States Postal Service and Chairman of Postal Service Board of 
Contract Appeals; fonner Administrative Judge with Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals. J.D., Loyola University School of Law, 1950; admitted to the bars of Illinois, 
Federal District Coun for Northem District of Illinois, United States Supreme Coun 
and United States Coun of Claims. 
This anicle was written by the author in his private capacity. No official suppon or 
endorsement by the Depanment of Health &: Human Services or any fonner depanment 
with which the author was associated is intended or should be inferred. 
The author wishes to express his appreciation for the research assistance provided 
by Ron Piombino, a law student at the Westem New England College School of Law. 
1. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). 
2. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 404.944 (1983) (Social Security Administration). The regu­
lations vary from agency to agency. 
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bar and to the public at large that this function is faithfully and com­
petently discharged. 
The federal government has consistently maintained high quali­
fication standards to insure, insofar as possible, the appointment of 
individual trial judges based on experience and merit and to afford a 
level of independence not associated with other executive depart­
ment positions, in recognition of the unique nature of the position 
and to instill public confidence in the system. The Article I judge 
does not have the independence or stature of the Article III federal 
judiciary since he is still an employee of the Executive Department 
and subject to its jurisdiction and appropriate control and supervi­
sion in most matters,3 although not in the exercise of his honest and 
independent judgment in ruling on matters before him or deciding 
cases, except insofar as he is bound by lawful agency regulations. 
This does not, however, alter the judicial nature of the adjudicatory 
function involved.4 
Much has been written about the role of administrative law 
judges in relationship to the agency's superior authority and about 
congressional policy and intent. It is not the purpose of this article to 
address these issues. Certainly there has been a trend toward 
judicialization in the administrative process and this tends to create 
an appearance of separation of interests but there is little question 
that the agency retains ultimate authority to accept or reject an ad­
3. The administrative law judge is appointed in accordance with the Administra­
tive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.c. § 3105 (1982). An action may be taken against an adminis­
trative law judge only if good cause is found by the Merit Systems Protection Board.Id. 
§7521 (1982). 
4. The chief senatorial sponsor of the Administrative Procedure Act attributed to it 
the design "to make examiners a separate and independent corps of hearing officers wor­
thy of judicial traditions," McCarran, Three Years ofThe Administrative Procedure Act­
A Study In Legis/ation, 38 GEO. LJ. 574, 583 (1950), and to make them "(o)n paper at 
least...very nearly the equivalent of judges, albeit operating within the federal system 
of administrative justice." Id. at 582. Perhaps the leading case in recognizing the judicial 
nature of the role of the federal administrative law judge is Butz v. &:onomou, 438 U.S. 
478 (1978), where the United States Supreme Court held that such judges have an abso­
lute immunity from liability for damages for actions taken in their quasi-judicial capac­
ity. 438 U.S. at 514. The Court stated that "although a qualified immunity from damages 
liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional vio­
lations, our decisions recognize that there are some officials whose special functions re­
quire a full exemption from liability." Id. at 508. It went on to state that "adjudication 
within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial 
process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits 
for damages," id. at 512-13, and that "(t)here can be little doubt that the role of the 
modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is 
'functionally comparable' to that of a judge." Id. at 513. 
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ministrative law judge's decision,s to issue federal regulations which 
have the force and effect of law,6 and, in many cases, to issue prece­
dential decisions binding on an administrative law judge.7 This arti­
cle starts with the reality that administrative law judges exist and 
that they exist to hear and decide cases without bias or interference. 
Due process does not require in every instance a formal eviden­
tiary hearing or require a decisionmaker possessing the qualifica­
tions of an administrative law judge or one given the statutory 
mantle of protection and implied independence given to administra­
tive law judges.s That issue relates, however, to cases in which the 
federal agency chooses not to provide, and no statute requires pro­
viding, the type of trier of fact we know as the administrative law 
judge. When the federal commitment is made to provide the higher 
level right - the right to be heard by an administrative law judge ­
the issue of appropriate independence takes on greater meaning. 
To place the issue of "independence" in proper perspective it 
first must be recognized that there are substantive differences be­
tween Social Security hearings and other federal agency hearings 
presided over by administrative law judges. However, as a starting 
premise it g~nerally is conceded by all of goodwill that true indepen­
dence in the sense of freedom from bias, coercion or outside influ­
ence affecting either the process of a fair hearing or the substantive 
decision issuing thereafter is essential in all hearings. Secondly, there 
should be no quaint distinction between direct interference with that 
purpose and subtle interference with that purpose. Both are anath­
ema to fairness. It is a basic principle that responsibility is not given 
witho~t correlative authority sufficient to carry out that 
responsibility. 
The role of the administrative law judge in the federal govern­
ment is mainly to determine facts and then apply the law. There are 
relatively few cases in which new legal precedent is being estab­
lished or where the law is seriously in question. There are indeed 
federal agency proceedings where the judge's decision does serve as 
a precedent and, in effect, shapes the development of the law, but 
this is certainly not the situation in Social Security cases where the 
question of ''independence'' has most frequently been raised. The 
5. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). Each agency determines the details for agency review of ad­
ministrative law judges' decisions. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967-.983 (1983). 
6. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295 (1979). 
7. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 422.408 (1983). 
8. Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188,200 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319,334 (1976). 
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few court cases which have addressed the problem have not resolved 
it yet since they await the resolution of factual allegations in cases 
still pending where crucial findings have not been made yet.9 
The administrative law judge functioning as a fact finder must 
weigh evidence and assess credibility. In virtually all cases he is op­
erating on a record different from that which the preliminary agency 
decisionmaker utilized, not only in the form of further documentary 
evidence but also in the form of live testimony. Also, quite often 
legal representation first surfaces at the hearing level. Despite the 
power and duty of the administrative law judge (other than in Social 
Security cases) to promote settlement, the nature of the administra­
tive process changes and the negotiating table is exchanged for the 
courtroom, although that forum is still available to the parties. 
In adversary hearings it is not unusual to find the full case first 
unveiled at the hearing. Whether this is due to the inherent nature of 
the proceeding with its access to discovery and right of cross exami­
nation or whether this is due to the opposing parties' realization that 
this is their last chance to produce evidence, the effect is the same. 
Positions firmly taken in initial stages of the process leading to the 
hearing are often tempered when the opposing side's evidence is 
viewed in this perspective. Firm convictions sometimes become best 
estimates and firm recollections only best recollections. Slight holes 
in the documentary record often take on larger proportions. Quali­
fied experts concede some value to the viewpoints of opposing quali­
fied experts and scientific fact becomes scientific opinion. If the 
hearing process is fair and complete, if the evidence is fully adduced 
and the parties properly prepared, the hearing process is well suited 
to arrive at the objective truth on an issue as best as humanly possi­
ble. On the other hand in nonadversarial hearings where the govern­
ment is unrepresented, as in Social Security cases, the 
administrative law judge has a greater burden in discharging his 
duty to develop the evidence and is more often faced with the diffi­
cult question of credibility not so common in other cases. 
The value of any system purporting to utilize an unbiased trier 
of fact, whether titled "trial judge," "administrative law judge," 
"hearing examiner" or "commissioner," rests on the integrity of the 
9. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980), was remanded by the court of 
appeals to the district court after upholding the administrative law judge's standing to 
sue on allegations of agency interference with his decisional independence. No further 
decision has been issued as of this writing. Nor has a decision been issued by the District 
Court for the District of Columbia in Association of Administrative Law Judges, Inc. v. 
Heckler, No. 83-124 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 19, 1983). 
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individual occupying the position. Further, it assumes a procedure 
reasonably calculated to assure the opportunity to hear and consider 
all relevant evidence and to reach a decision without outside influ­
ence. This is true whether the decision is the final decision or an 
intermediate decision subject to further appeal. When someone is 
provided by law and regulation with detailed quasi-judicial respon­
sibilities, and explicit powers, and when rights are provided litigants, 
a promise is made. The promise is fulfilled only if in fact substance 
follows form. If this is lacking, the purpose of the procedure is frus­
trated. These considerations are often overlooked in discussions 
concentrating on the "overview" of a system and on statistical per­
formance. Fundamentals thus become implicitly, if not expressly, 
relegated to a place of secondary importance or are simply assumed 
to be present despite evidence to the contrary. Unquestionably there 
are very real problems existing in agencies of the federal and state 
governments with respect to case baCklogs and processing times. 10 
Moreover, it is clear that both federal and state agencies hold the 
policymaking power and have the final word, subject only to court 
review. This does not change, however, the inherent function of the 
trial judge. Erroneous decisions can be reversed by a reviewing au­
thority. Apparent confficts in law or regulations can be remedied by 
new law and new regulations. Improper conduct can be dealt with 
by removal actions. The fact remains that a litigant who is led to 
believe that he will have an unbiased trier of fact who will carefully 
consider all the relevant evidence under a designated procedure 
should be given what is promised. Thus, any study of the effective­
ness of the administrative hearing system must ask first whether it is 
doing what it is intended to do and what it holds itself out to the 
public as doing. This is a question of fact. It is a question of how it 
works and how well it works. A comparison between some federal 
agencies may provide some insight in this regard. 
II. FEDERAL AGENCY HEARING UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE 

PROCEDURE ACT OR PATTERNED AFTER IT 

The United States Postal Service is charged under federal stat­
ute with protecting the public against material false representation 
by mail. I I In the Postal Service, there is an Office of Administrative 
10. See Day v. Schweiker. 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982). cert. granted. 103 S. Ct. 1873 
(1983); Caswell v. Califano. 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); Blankenship v. Mathews. 587 F.2d 
329 (6th Cir. 1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977). eerl. denied 435 U.S. 
908 (1978); Crosby v. SSA. 550 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Mass. 1982). 
II. 39 U.S.C. § 3005 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
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Law Judges empowered to hear cases brought by complaints filed by 
the consumer protection branch of the General Counsel's office. The 
cases are litigated cases in which the respondent, who is charged 
with violation of the false representation statute, is normally also 
represented by private counsel. 
Although some hearings are longer, an average case is heard in 
less than half a day. The administrative law judge then issues a deci­
sion from which either party may appeal to the Postal Service's Judi­
cial Officer. The Judicial Officer is a statutory position with the 
incumbent appointed by the Postmaster General to act finally for 
him.12 The Judicial Officer then issues a final decision which, if un­
favorable to the respondent, is accompanied by a mail stop order. 13 
This order stops all mail addressed to the respondent unless it is 
clear that such mail has no connection with the offending false ad­
vertisement. The time from filing of complaint to issuance of a mail 
stop order is often less than 90 days. 
False advertising may also be the subject of a complaint and 
hearing before the Federal Trade Commission. The case is heard by 
an administrative law judge who also issues an initial decision. The 
review authority is the Federal Trade Commission itself aided by 
supporting staff, rather than a single chief judicial officer. The time 
between filing a complaint and final agency decision is generally 
longer than at the Postal Service. Both agencies are empowered to 
settle the case through consent orders with the respondent and this 
often happens obviating the need for hearings and decisions. In both 
agencies the administrative law judges are completely independent 
in arriving at their decisions and conduct full due process hearings 
issuing detailed findings of fact and analysis supporting the conclu­
sion reached. Because the complaints normally involve exaggerated 
claims with respect to a product, it is not unusual to have expert 
testimony. Generally the cases are decided on the particular facts 
12. 	 39 U.S.C. § 204 (1976) provides: 
There shall be within the Postal Service a General Counsel, such number 
of Assistant Postmasters General as the Board shall consider appropriate, and a 
Judicial Officer. The General Counsel, the Assistant Postmasters General, and 
the Judicial Officer shall be appointed by, and serve at the pleasure of, the Post­
master General. The Judicial Officer shall perform such quasi-judicial duties, 
not inconsistent with chapter 36 of this title, as the Postmaster General may 
designate. The Judicial Officer shall be the agency for the purposes of the re­
quirements of chapter 5 of title 5, to the extent that functions are delegated to 
him by the Postmaster General. 
13. Act of November 30,1983, Pub. L. No. 98-186, 97 Stat. 1315, now authorizes 
the issuance of cease and desist orders as an additional enforcement tool. 
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although previous cases are used as precedent. The decisions of the 
Postal Service administrative law judges and the judicial officer are 
printed and are available on request to the public. 14 The decisions of 
the Federal Trade Commission are published and likewise avail­
able. ls Published case precedents are thereby provided and such pre­
cedent serves as a guide to the agency consumer protection 
departments in bringing later cases and to the public in knowing 
what to expect. The system is essentially that of an independent trial 
judge whose decision is subject to agency review upon motion of 
either party and ultimate recourse to federal court review. The sys­
tem works because it provides what it promises to provide. 
The role of the trier of fact in a federal agency proceeding is 
generally complicated by the existence of conflicting evidence. In 
many agencies this evidence is highly technical and there are oppos­
ing professional or scientific opinions or both. Certainly this is true 
in most cases involving medical issues. Very often the medical opin­
ion relies heavily upon underlying facts which are essentially credi­
bility issues. For example, the severity and extent of pain relating to 
an objective injury also involves subjective factors and credibility of 
a witness. Whether or not an important and material conversation 
took place likewise may depend upon a determination of credibility. 
Questions of an individual's participation in certain alleged activities 
or knowledge of a certain fact, or receipt of a particular notice all 
involve an issue of credibility. While there may be substantial cor­
roborating documentary evidence there often is not and unless testi­
mony is to be considered completely irrelevant it must be weighed. 
There is little need for a hearing in the normal sense of the word 
unless testimony is to be taken and given some weight. While there 
is always the so called "clear cut" case, the majority of cases unfortu­
nately still require the resolution of conflicting evidence and the 
evaluation of live testimony. In fairness, something more than a pa­
per review is required. In all of the agencies that utilize administra­
tive law judges, recognition of this fact is found not only in the 
establishment of a system providing hearings but also in the detailed 
regulations and rules governing the process. Federal court cases re­
viewing agency decisions are replete with holdings representing the 
judicial expectation that such hearings be complete and fair in all 
respects, with full consideration given to all of the evidence and that 
14. These decisions are available for public inspection in the Postal Services Head­
quarters Library in Washington, D.C. 39 C.F.R. § 265.6(a)(2) (1983). 
15. See the Federal Trade Commission reporter. 
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such consideration be reflected in the agency's written decision. 16 
Dependent upon the particular subject matter jurisdiction in a given 
agency, argument might be made that a different process would be 
better suited to carrying out the agency function. Once a need for an 
unbiased hearing is conceded, however, the need for a trial judge 
becomes self-evident. 
In addition to administrative law judges appointed under the 
Administrative Procedure Act,17 federal agencies employ adminis­
trative judges in other areas not specifically covered by the Act. This 
further illustrates recognition of the value of the administrative trial 
proceeding and its effectiveness. 
The federal government is the largest purchaser in the world. It 
is engaged in buying supplies and equipment, in research, in con­
struction and in numerous other programs. All of this is done 
through federal contracts and these contracts provide for processing 
of claims, either by or against the government, and resolution of dis­
putes through an administrative hearing process governed by a 
Board of Contract Appeals utilizing administrative judges. Although 
the Board's hearing process is not governed by the Administrative 
Procedure Act, its judges are appointed under stringent standards 
and act independently of federal agency influence. 
Most major federal departments have a Board of Contract Ap­
peals and those that do not have delegated that responsibility to an­
other Agency's Board of Contract Appeals,1s The hearings are 
adversary proceedings, generally with counsel for each party. One 
administrative judge will hear the case as trial judge. A transcript of 
the hearing is available to him and that judge, if still available, will 
prepare the decision, which is then submitted to a panel of the Board 
16. See Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S.Ct. 1952 (1983); Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697 
F.ld 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (lIth Cir. 1982); Wiggins 
v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1982); Smith v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 
1982); Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.ld 893 (ld Cir. 1980); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23 
(2d Cir. 1979); Newborn v. Harris,602 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979); Rico v. Secretary, 593 
F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), cerro denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); Northcutt V. Califano, 581 F.2d 164 
(8th Cir. 1978); Beavers V. Secretary, 577 F.ld 383 (6th Cir. 1978); Daniel v. Mathews, 
567 F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1977); Thome V. Weinberger, 530 F.2d 580 (4th Cir. 1976); Coulter 
V. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1975); Miranda V. Secretary, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 
1975); Yawitz V. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 956 (8th Cir. 1974); DePaepe V. Richardson, 464 
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972); Bittel V. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193 (3d Cir. 1971); Kutchman V. 
Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970); Mark V. Celebrezze, 348 F.ld 289 (10th Cir. 1965); 
Celebrezze V. Warren, 339 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1964). 
17. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). 
18. Contract Disputes Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (codified at 41 
U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (Supp. V 1981». 
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if it is a large Board, such as the Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals, or to the full Board if it is a small Board, such as the Postal 
Service Board of Contract Appeals, where the file is reviewed by 
each Board member participating. Concurring and dissenting opin­
ions may be written. A majority vote controls the decision. These 
decisions are published decisions and used as precedent in future 
cases. There is no further agency review. There is the right to court 
review but it is not commonly pursued which may be taken as a 
tribute of sorts to the competence of the decisions being issued. 
These administrative judges thus perform two functions. The 
first is as a trial judge. The second is as a concurring or dissenting 
member on review of a case. On review of a case, those judges that 
have reviewed the file and read the briefs and draft decision collabo­
rate in the way appellate judges might, to arrive at a consensus 
before the decision is finally released. This system has been recog­
nized as effective over the years by the executive departments, by the 
practicing bar, by the Judiciary and by the Congress. 19 
The establishment of Boards of Contract Appeals grew out of a 
need to arrive at the resolution of claims without resort to the 
COUrts.2O By virtue of utilization of the Boards of Contract Appeals, 
however, there is built up a substantial base of precedentiallaw in 
the federal procurement law field. This has been beneficial to those 
who deal with the government as well as to those who act on its 
behalf. The government must manage extensive programs under 
multiple regulations and numerous contract clauses which, standing 
alone do not resolve all possible questions and, of course, cannot 
resolve fact disputes. The decisions of the Boards of Contract Ap­
peals fill this need. 
Needless to say the Boards' decisions are not always favorable 
to the government agency presenting its side of the dispute. This has 
not produced an antipathy between agencies and administrative 
judges serving on their Boards of Contract Appeals. Rather, there is 
a feeling of general respect despite disagreement with any particular 
result. In fact, it was largely through the efforts of the federal pro­
19. S. REP. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Scss. 2-4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE 
CONGo &: AD. NEWS 5235, 5236-38. 
20. It might be said that because the total dockets of these Boards arc probably less 
than four thousand c:ascs, it would not unduly burden the court system to have these 
cases heard in court. The number of cases is not necessarily revcaling however. The last 
case the author heard as a judge on the Armed Forces Board of Contract Appeals in­
volved a claim for thirty-seven million dollars and lasted sixty-seven full trial days. It 
was then settled at which time the attorneys estimated that to complete the tria1 presenta­
tion would take at least another sixty-seven trial days. 
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curement bar that a model code was developed for state and local 
procurement fashioned after the federal experience.21 
III. SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS 
The hearing procedures in Social Security cases as set forth in 
the federal regulations22 provide the same essential rights to claim­
ants as are found in other federal agency hearings. They are not 
adversary hearings, however, because there is no attorney present to 
advocate the government's position.23 Moreover, pleadings, nor­
mally required in other federal agency hearing procedures, are not 
required. 
The discovery procedures common to many other federal ad­
ministrative hearings are not generally employed in Social Security 
hearings, although subpoena powers exist and claimants have the 
right to cross-examination. Upon proper motion, claimants may 
cross-examine the government examining physicians and, of course, 
any medical or vocational expert, called by the administrative law 
judge to testify at the hearing.24 The administrative law judge is 
charged with the additional function of ensuring that missing mate­
rial reports are obtained,25 a function not normally assigned to the 
21. MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE (1979). 
22. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.9()()...995, 416.1400-.1494 (1983). 
23. The Social Security Administration has established a government representa­
tive program which at this writing is still in a test stage but in any event is not expected to 
include the majority of cases being heard. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.965,416.1465 (1983). 
24. Any party to a hearing has a right to appear before an administrative law judge 
and to present evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.950(a), 416.1450(a) (1983). 
25. Smith v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 1982); Hankerson v. Harris, 
636 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1980); Daniel v. Mathews, 567 F.2d 845, 848 (8th Cir. 1977); 
Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224,229 (3d Cir. 1975); see also the concurring opinion 
of Justice Brennan in Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S.Ct. 1952 (1983) in which he states in 
pertinent part: 
I join the Court's opinion. It merits comment, however, that the hearing 
respondent received,. . .if it is in any way indicative of standard practice, re­
flects poorly on the Administrative Law Judge's adherence to what Chief Judge 
Godbold has called his "duty of inquiry": 
(T]here is a 'basic obligation' on the [administrative law judge) in these 
nonadversarial proceedings to develop a full and fair record, which obliga­
tion rises to a "special duty . . . to scrupulously and conscientiously ex­
plore for all relevant facts" where an unrepresented claimant has not 
waived counsel. This duty of inquiry on the [administrative law judge) 
would include, in a case decided under the grids, a duty to inquire into 
possible nonexertional impairments and into exertional limitations that 
prevent a full range of work. 
Id. at 1959 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1364 
(11th Cir. 1982». After citing many cases Justice Brennan continued: 
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trier of fact. The Social Security judge also carries the burden of 
conducting the examination of the claimant and other witnesses at 
the hearing when the claimant is unrepresented and, where the 
claimant is represented, ofconducting sufficient examination to com­
plete the testimony to his satisfaction. 
The judge may call upon a medical or vocational expert to tes­
tify at the hearing, and has the further obligation to develop addi­
tional medical evidence after the hearing if that appears appropriate. 
For example, a claimant may appear at a hearing with a medical 
report indicating a recent development of, or new medical opinion 
regarding his or her physical condition which requires further exam­
ination or the input of independent medical opinion. It may be clear 
from the hearing testimony or a report received at the hearing that 
psychological testing is important and therefore it will be ordered at 
government expense. A fair proportion of disability cases involve 
psychiatric impairments or combined psychiatric and physical im­
pairments and the difficulties in assessing the existence and actual 
effect of such impairments often present extremely complex factual 
judgments.26 
The problem in assessing pain allegations also can be readily 
recognized. It is illustrated in the numerous court decisions remand­
ing cases for further detailed consideration of such allegations even 
in the absence of clear clinical findings supporting the allegations.27 
The "duty of inquiry" derives from claimants' basic statutory and constitu­
tional rights to due process in the adjudication of their claims, including a de 
nollO hearing. p-ee Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-335, 339 (1976), 
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402-404 (1971). See also Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-263 (1970»). Inherent in the concept of a due process 
hearing is the decisionmaker's obligation to inform himself about the facts rele­
vant to his decision and to learn the claimant's own version of the facts. (Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 465, 580 (1975).) 
Id. at 1959 n.l. Justice Brennan noted that "in her brief to this Court, the secretary 
acknowledges that the Social Security regulations embody this duty and relies upon it in 
answering respondent's Due Process contentions." Id. at 1959-60. 
26. Not only is it common to find a difference of medical opinion in the record but 
there is often apparent confiict between the opinion given in support of a patient's disa­
bility claim and the doctor's own treatment notes or his reports to other sources. Beyond 
that there is the critical question of how the medical impairment in fact functionally 
restricts the particular individual, an issue rife with subjective considerations, and one 
which can become even more ethereal where claims of psychiatric illness are alleged. An 
attorney representing a client in a non-adversary hearing. must strictly adhere to the 
bar's standards of ethical conduct in presenting documentary evidence and sworn testi­
mony. Since the witnesses' credibility depends in large part upon compliance with their 
oath to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, the attorney must, to the 
best of his or her ability, see that this is done. 
27. It is well established law in all the federal circuits that the administrative law 
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The problem may be put into proper perspective best by asking how 
this can be done without simply accepting the allegations and 
thereby converting the disability process into a self certification pro­
cedure, a result certainly not intended by the law. Clearly, the ques­
tion is a factual question. Just as clearly, without outside 
investigation, the corroboration of the allegations and the proof to 
show the true functional restrictions in a given case is going to be less 
than what one would normally expect in a litigated personal injury 
case, for example, where the amount of money at stake may in fact 
be far less than in the average disability hearing.28 Obviously the 
taxpayer has an interest in seeing that some reasonable accomoda­
tion is made to provide a reasonably fair result and this requires at a 
bare minimum a detailed review of every observation in the written 
record, a complete examination of the witnesses and a thorough 
comparison for inconsistencies. When it is considered that medical 
reports provided by treating and consulting· physicians sometimes 
consist of sparse clinical findings and conclusions based principally 
on the claimants statements of symptoms the magnitude of the credi­
bility issue29 comes into finer focus, and so then does the importance 
of the role of the trier of fact. 
judge has the duty to evaluate and assess subjective complaints. Gallagher v. Schweiker, 
697 F.2d 82, 83-84 (ld Cir. 1983); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966, 970 (11th Cir. 
1982); Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1391 (11th Cir. 1982); Marcus v. Califano, 
615 F.ld 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979); Newborn v. Harris, 602 F.ld lOS, 107 (5th Cir. 1979); Rico 
v. Secretary, 593 F.2d 431, 433 (1st. Cir.) cerr. denied, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); Northcutt v. 
Califano, 581 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1978); Beavers v. Secretary, 577 F.2d 383, 386 (6th 
Cir. 1978); Thome v. Weinberger, 530 F.2d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 1976); Miranda v. Secre­
tary, 514 F.2d 996, 1000 (lst Cir. 1975); Yawitz v. Weinberger, 498 F.2d 956, 957 (8th Cir. 
1974); DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92, 99 (5th Cir. 1972); Bittel v. Richardson, 441 
F.2d 1193, 1195 (3d Cir. 1971); Kutcbman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1970); 
Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 292 (10th Cir. 1965); Celebrezze v. Warren, 339 F.2d 
833, 838 (10th Cir. 1964). 
28. The significant economic impact not only for the claimant as an individual but 
for the tax paying public is highlighted by the volume of claims (over 300,000 requests 
for hearing in fiscal year 1982), in what has been termed ''probably the largest adjudica­
tory system in the western world," Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1954 n.2 (1983) 
(quoting J. MAsHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ Be P. VERKUlL, SOCIAL 
SECURITY HEAJUNGS AND APPEALS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA­
TION HEARING SYSTEM xi (1978», and by the amount of money involved, which has 
been estimated as high as $100,000 per case in remarks attributed to then Associate Com­
missioner Louis B. Hays at the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference on 
March 14, 1983. Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference Letter (April 28, 1983). 
Further, the number of cases pending in the federal Districts Courts has risen dramati­
cally with twice as many cases being filed in fiscal year 1983 as in fiscal year 1982. 
29. It is well settled that the administrative law judge is expected to make credibili­
ty findings. See, e.g., Tieniber v. Heckler, 720 F.ld 1251, 1254 (11th Cir. 1983); Andrews 
v. Schweiker, 680 F.2d 559, 561 (8th Cir. 1982); Walker v. Matthews, 546 F.2d 814, 820 
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Social Security administrative law judges' monthly production 
figures over the past five years show substantial increases.30 Addi­
tional support staff and word processors are partially responsible. 
Production "goals" of twenty-five case dispositions per month have 
risen to forty or fifty in an attempt to keep pace with increases in the 
number of requests for hearings. Low producing judges are coun­
seled and in some cases formal removal actions have been instituted. 
There is no indication that there is any policy to counsel judges pro­
ducing sixty to one hundred case dispositions per month. However, it 
is obvious that there are differences in perception as to how much 
time a judge needs to spend on a case to reasonably carry out his 
duties. These differences necessarily implicate the practical aspects 
of thoroughly obtaining and reviewing the documentary evidence 
and of conducting thorough inquiry at the hearing. Public concern 
with this inconsistency is perhaps muted by high reversal rates.3l A 
quick hearing and short decision is quite acceptable to the claimant 
who has won his case. Nevertheless administration concern with the 
rise in reversal rates, paralleling increased receipts and calls for in­
creased productivity, resulted in abolishment of the short form mem­
orandum decision in reversal cases and the substitution of the 
requirement that all decisions be long form decisions explaining the 
rationale for the reversal.32 
Human nature being what it is, some judges who are pressured 
to get out more cases in a non-adversary setting may find it easier to 
speed things up by acting more on instinct than on thoroughness. If 
that is done, of course, the ultimate loser is either the claimant or the 
(9th Cir. 1976); Melendez v. Schweiker, 550 F. Supp. 1294, 1295 (D. Mass. 1982); 
Sclewich v. Finch, 312 F. Supp. 191, 195 (D. Mass. 1969). 
30. The number of requests for administrative law judge hearings in the area of 
disability benefits has risen from 226,200 in 1979 to 326,300 in 1982. The number of 
requests processed has increased from 210,775 in 1979 to 300,000 in 1982. S. REp. No. 
648 97th Cong., 2d Scss. 20 (1982), reprinle" in 1982 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
4373,4391. 
31. In the first quarter of 1982 the percent ofcases reversed after initial denials was 
57.3 and after terminations was 65.4.1". 
32. The concern is further rcflcc:tcd by the Social Security Disability Amendments 
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94 Stat. 441 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 421 (Supp. v 
1981», which required an ongoing review of administrative law judge decisions by the 
Social Security Administration. Commonly referred to as the "Bellmon review" the re­
quirement grew out of congressional concern over the high percentage of cases that were 
being granted by administrative law judges. The question is not free of controversy. See 
SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MANAGEMENT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON 
GOV'TAL AFFAIRS, THE ROLE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN THE TITLE II 
SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROORAM, S. REp. No. Ill, 98th Cong., 1st 
Scss. (1983). 
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taxpayer depending upon the result, but consistency also suffers as 
does integrity. When conflicting interests are not properly balanced, 
the result is a subtle corrosion. Whether this is stated in terms of 
intrusion upon the "independence" of the judges or "due process" or 
meeting "goals" matters little for what is contemplated by law is 
frustrated in fact. The problem is created by a number of factors: the 
enormity of the caseload; the complexity of the cases; the absence of 
truly objective standards;33 the tendency of the courts to impose 
deadlines on processing;34 the desire of the agency to obtain ''uni­
formity" despite the unique nature of each case and the clash of two 
different disciplines; the policy makers and administrators, who are 
inclined to view the larger picture in terms of dollars and case dispo­
sitions; and the judges, who are inclined to view the individual case. 
Unless truly objective standards can be developed and promul­
gated there will continue to be, as there is in all litigation, the need 
for the trier of fact. As long as there is such a need, one thing is clear: 
The solution does not lie in diluting the judge's role because there 
are no short cuts to that form of justice. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the scope of federal and state administrative hearings, it 
is , or at least should be, evident to the practicing bar that sooner or 
later most practicing lawyers will find themselves with a client who 
must pursue the administrative hearing route as a substitute for, or 
prerequisite, to any court action. Because of burgeoning court dock­
ets and the widely accepted agency hearing process before a quali­
fied judge insulated from outside in1luence, it can be expected that 
this process will expand rather than contract. Nor is it idle specula­
tion to expect that ever increasing admissions to the bar and broader 
awareness, or evolving establishment, of legal rights will increase 
33. Judges, no matter how experienced in hearing and deciding medical cases are 
not medical doctors. It is simplistic to say that confticting medical opinion is easily re­
solved by lay people by reference to "objective" medical evidence. This is particularly 
true because the federal courts require concise judicial evaluations of pain and require 
that substantial weight be given to opinions of treating physicians. Wiggins v. Schweiker, 
679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir. 1982); Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 840 (11th Cir. 
1982); Smith v. Schweiker, 646 F.2d 1075, 1081 (5th Cir. 1981). If it were simple to quan­
tify objective medical evidence in terms of functional restrictions, then regulations would 
exist to control particular decisions. Such regulations do not exist, however, except in the 
most clear cut cases. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501-.1599 app. (1983). 
34. Day v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1982), un. granted, 103 S.Ct. 1873 
(J983)(No. 82-1371); Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1978); Blankenship v. Ma­
thews, 587 F.2d 329 (6th Cir. 1978); White v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1977), em. 
denied 435 U.S. 908 (1978); Crosby v. SSA, 550 F. Supp. 1278 (D. Mass. 1982). 
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caseloads significantly in some areas. The lawyer advising corporate 
clients involved, even tangentially, with federal or state contract or 
grant programs will soon discover that some knowledge in these ar­
eas may be vital to a client's interests. If these areas are considered 
too broadly as "specialty" areas, the time to consult the specialist 
may be too late and the evidence to prove the case too little since 
concurrent records far surpass later recollection. The latter principle 
applies equally to individual clients in many areas, the most evident 
of which is where causation and resultant damage issues are in­
volved and most certainly in any claim involving medical issues. Ad­
ministrative law, once considered a highly specialized field of little 
interest to the general practitioner, is now a field which touches all 
areas in the practice of law. Thus an awareness of its varied 
processes is as important to the bar as is a knowledge of substantive 
law. 
The worth of any adjudicatory system of course can also be 
measured by other standards such as its economic feasibility, its pub­
lic acceptance or its political implications, to mention but a few. Al­
ternative processes may, in one or more areas, have greater merit. 
What is important to bear in mind, however, is that the nature of 
such alternatives is in reality vastly different from the existing pro­
cess. Thus, the not so subtle impact of having a judge's pay raises 
rest in the hands of supervisors who have valid concerns with pro­
duction quotas, processing times and the cost of the program, mea­
sured in part by the decisional results, can justifiably be said to 
interfere with the integrity of the decision process. This fact was 
clearly recognized by Congress and resulted in the passage of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. Substitute procedures involving mini­
mal "due process" mandated by practical considerations and the 
breadth of legal rights are found in controlling court decisions3s but 
are based on limiting rights to the type of hearing contemplated by 
the Administrative Procedure Act and should not be equated to it. 
Once that right is granted it should not be watered down by practical 
and policy considerations so that it loses its intended purpose. 
Rather those considerations should encourage finding ways to pro­
vide the right more effectively by eliminating flaws in the system to 
the extent possible but always consistent with the true purpose of the 
hearing procedure. This problem takes on much larger proportions 
in facing the enormous workload of an agency such as the Social 
35. Schweiker v. McClure. 456 U.s. 188 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319 
(1976). 
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Security Disability Program than it does in other federal agencies. 
Nevertheless, the principle should be the same as long as the recog­
nized method of deciding cases is the hearing process. Congressional 
action in the Social Security area has concentrated primarily on pro­
tection of claimants' rights and changes in Social Security proce­
dures apart from the hearing procedure. The federal court cases 
however have been virtually unanimous in recognizing and enforc­
ing the duty of administrative law judges to provide fully and exactly 
what the Administrative Procedure Act and federal regulations re­
quire in hearing and deciding cases.36 There is no question but that 
those who are disabled should be given benefits. The corollary is that 
those who are not disabled should not be given benefits. In a hearing 
process which has only one side appearing, it is all the more incum­
bent on the trial judge to be thorough to insure that justice is done. 
Whether a different or less involved procedure would meet the 
requirements of due process is determined by the three prong test set 
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.37 Mathews 
requires an analysis of the private interest to be protected, the effec­
tiveness of existing procedures in reasonably guaranteeing those 
rights and the pros and cons of additional or substitute procedures.38 
If the question is, however, whether the federal administrative hear­
ing procedure as currently mandated by federal law and regulation 
can provide what it promises to the public, the answer is clear. It can 
if the federal agency wants it to do so and if the administrative law 
judges fully and faithfully carry out their sworn duty. The agency 
demonstrates its intent in direct proportion to the extent it cooperates 
in supporting and honoring its obligations set forth in its own regula­
tions establishing that procedure. Justice requires the effective recog­
nition and protection of lawful rights and correspondingly the 
enforcement of lawful obligations. It requires the fair resolution of 
36. Heckler v. Campbell, 103 S. Ct. 1952 (1983); Gallagher v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 
966 (11th Cir. 1982); Simpson v. Schweiker, 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982); Wiggins v. 
Schweiker, (11th Cir.1982); Hankerson v. Harris, 636 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1980); Marcus v. 
Califano, 615 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1979); Newborn v. Harris, 602 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1979); 
Rico v. Secretary, 593 F.2d 431 (1st Cir.), em. dmieti, 444 U.S. 858 (1979); Northcutt v. 
Califano, 581 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1978); Beavers v. Secretary, 577 F.ld 383 (6th Cir. 1978); 
Daniel v. Mathews, 567 F.ld 845 (8th Cir. 1977); Thome v. Weinberger, 530 F.2d 580 
(4th Cir. 1976); Coulter v. Weinberger, 527 F.2d 224 (3d Cir. 1975); Miranda v. Secre­
tary, 514 F.2d 996 (1st Cir. 1975); Yawitz v. Weinberger, 498 F.ld 956 (8th Cir. 1974); 
DePaepe v. Richardson, 464 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972); Bittel v. Richardson, 441 F.2d 1193 
(3d Cir. 1971); Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th Cir. 1970); Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 
F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1965); Celebrez:ze v. Warren, 339 F.ld 833 (10th Cir. 1964). 
37. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
38. lti. at 335. 
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factual disputes applying accepted principles of lawful authority. It 
is therefore incumbent upon policy makers and administrators, and 
not only upon judges, to cooperate in seeing that this is done. If the 
cost in terms of time or money is too high that is a determination 
that should be openly addressed jointly by those who make the law 
and those who set policy and administer programs but not by judges 
who take an oath to faithfully carry out their responsibility to pro­
vide what the existing law requires. The judge's singular interest is, 
and should be, only to render an impartial decision after thorough 
inquiry and review. When these functions are merged they tend to 
compromise in practice what should only be compromised by or­
derly, open, legislative and regulatory processes. In this process the 
practicing bar has an obligation to become better informed and to 
take an active part, not so much from a self interest standpoint, but 
from the higher standpoint of securing an orderly and effective sys­
tem of justice intended to serve not only individual interests but the 
public at large. 
